Like other sciences, criminology is international and global. But it is well known that for many decades Russian criminology was isolated from scholarship in other countries and under rigorous political and ideological control. However, during the 1960s a 'parallel' theoretical and empirical criminology evolved in the former Soviet Union without party or state approval. This parallel tradition both accumulated empirical data and advanced a theoretical perspective which, in contrast with Soviet ideology, saw crime as a social phenomenon influenced by factors such as inequality, intergroup conflicts, strain arising from blocked opportunities, living conditions, and so on. This tradition emerged from underground only at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s when, thanks to Gorbachev's Perestroika [rebuilding, reconstruction], Russian scholars gained the freedom to teach, to carry out research and to foster professional contacts with foreign colleagues. Emerging from the 'parallel tradition', this article summarizes facts about contemporary Russian society that constitute the essential framework for understanding the crime situation. It discusses crime trends, organized crime, drug abuse and corruption. Finally it provides some basic information about social control and punishment in Russia.
Introduction
Criminality is an element of society and, therefore, closely related to other elements. Legal norms, especially those underpinning criminal law and its enforcement (these are not always identical) depend directly on the political regime. Because Russian political history in the 20th century was complex, the history of the law and the principles underlying the law was also turbulent.
Since the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Russia has faced serious challenges. Sadly, the high expectations for the establishment of liberal democracy that were raised in the Gorbachev era have not been fully realized. Crime trends, and the scale of drug addiction, corruption and other forms of deviance are significant indices of the social situation. 
Background information

Russia
The social situation in contemporary Russia
The level and pattern of crime, and of deviant behaviour that may or may not be criminal, such as drug and alcohol addiction, prostitution and suicide, are wholly dependent on the social, economic, political, cultural and demographic processes in society. Therefore, we begin with a sketch of the social situation in contemporary Russia.
It is clear that the communist regime caused death and destruction on a colossal scale. Yet, as a result of the unique experiment to establish a social Utopia (the slogan on the gate of the Solovki Gulag read 'Happiness for Everyone through Violence'), the country was abruptly thrown onto the path of development into a modern industrial economy.
Gorbachev's Perestroika was a necessary attempt to save the power structures by way of reform. A similar attempt had earlier been made by Khrushchev (the 'thaw'). However, every attempt finished with the political death of its propagators and was followed either by stagnation or by reaction.
To his credit, Gorbachev's reforms turned out to be the most radical (freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the multi-party system, the right to hold private property, the lifting of the Iron Curtain, and the release of states that had been occupied by Stalin, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). However these reforms were not carried through to their conclusion.
Since 1991, the disruption of production and disintegration of the economy has continued. Power has been returned to the ruling nomenklatura (people of power in totalitarian countries) (possibly along with new 'oligarchs' and criminals); corruption, already common in Russia, has now attained a monumental scale in all organs of established power, and within all law enforcement bodies; there is constant and continuing crisis of the health, education, transport and other social services, and of spiritual and moral values; the militarization of economics and politics continues, especially in the 21st century. We see now the growth of the role of the so-called 'power structures': the FSB (former KGB), the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and others. The war in Chechnya is terrifying evidence of neototalitarianism.
The country also permits human rights abuses on a massive scale, particularly in the army and penal institutions (see Walmsley 1996; Abramkin 1998; Gilinskiy 1998b; Index on Censorship 1999; Christie 2000; Position of Convicts in Contemporary Russia 2003; Walmsley 2002 Walmsley , 2003 . Nationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-fascist and skinhead groups are active and meet with no resistance. Attacks against the mass media whenever they adopted a critical stance began in 1999-2000 and have continued since.
The ever-growing economic polarization of the population -visible in the stark contrast between the impoverished majority and the nouveau riche (Kanfler 1965; Lenoir 1974; Paugam 1996; Young 1999; Finer and Nellis 1998) constitutes the social basis for various forms of deviance including crime and organized crime.
Crime in contemporary Russia
Trends in recorded crime from 1961 to 2005 are presented in Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-6. A number of points stand out:
• The rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of total recorded crimes decreased in 1963, and remained at a low point during Khrushchev's 'thaw' between 1963 and 1965 , then rose slowly and steadily between 1966 and 1986 . Gorbachev's Perestroika occurred between 1986 and 1988 In the second year of Perestroika (1987) the crime rate suddenly went down, and it stayed at this lower level in the following year, but from 1989, after the end of the Gorbachev era, the crime rate started a rapid increase, which continued for a five-year period, taking it from 816.9 in 1987 to 1887.8 in 1993; after 1993, the rising trend flattened strikingly, with some further increase in 1999, and a brief dip in 2002. The rate reached in 2005 was 2499.8.
• A sustained rise in the rate of homicide (including attempts) also started in the late 1980s: the rate increased from 6.3 in 1987 to 21.8 in 1994 and levelled off thereafter, reaching 22.1 in 2004.
• Trends for violent crimes (other than homicide) were similar to those for total crime in that there was a low point during the Gorbachev era followed by a strong rise between 1988 and 1993. The rate of grievous bodily harm levelled off from 1994, as in the case of total crime. The rates for robbery and robbery with violence also levelled off then declined for a while after 1994, but they then increased again quite strongly from 1998 onwards.
• Trends in the rates of recorded theft in the 1980s and 1990s were broadly similar to those for all recorded crimes. Thefts were at a low point during the Gorbachev period, increased very strongly from 1988 to 1993, then levelled off or generally declined (but with some local dips and rises). Although not shown in the tables here, the period of the Khrushchev 'thaw' had also seen a reduction in the rate of thefts.
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Germany, 1.1; Hungary, 2.3; Italy, 1.5; Japan, 1.0; Norway, 0.9; Poland, 2.0;
Spain, 1.1; Sweden, 1.1; Switzerland, 1.1; and USA, 5.6 (Barclay and Tavares 2003: 10) . As well as homicide, the rate of grievous bodily harm in Russia is high (Table 2 ). The number of crime victims in contemporary Russia is huge (Table 5 ).
The total number of deaths resulting from crimes over the period 1987-2003 was 1,190,352. In addition, 25,000 people are declared missing every year and are never found. In the military, from 5000-6000 die every year, excluding those involved in warfare. Most of them die due to violent, unregulated hazing rituals (dedovshina) and abuse of power by older soldiers that often takes sadistic forms, accidents related to military service and suicide.
What are the causes of high rates of serious violent crime in Russia? The detailed discussion by Tsytsarev and Gilinskiy (2004) • The proportion of drugs offenders who are young (14-29 years old) is about 70
per cent.
• The proportion without permanent occupation and income increased from 23. • The proportion who were in work steadily decreased too (but their proportion in the population also decreased steadily).
During the last few years there has been a shift in drug use from poppy straw to opium and heroin. The present scene has been called a 'heroin rainstorm'. This is probably a result of increased efficiency in the drug business, which can now provide a 'better service' to drug users. Heroin was not in great demand earlier because of its high price. Now drug dealers have improved its production and trafficking through Chechnya, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has led to a drop in the price of heroin and a rise in its popularity in Russian markets, including St.
Petersburg.
The progressive international shift from the 'war on drugs' towards 'harm reduction' is absent in Russia. The contemporary negative consequences of social change are also very important for drug treatment. On the one hand, the extent of drug use increases because many people (particularly young people) have no work or prospects and suffer from an 'existential vacuum' (Frankl 1984) . On the other hand, the policy of repression continues and the drug treatment system gets worse and worse.
We wrote in 1998: 'The extremely radical and rapid social changes under way in Russia today give rise to deep pessimism and lack of hope for the future' (Gilinskiy and Zobnev 1998: 122) . Unfortunately, we have turned out to be right.
The Russian drug policy and drug treatment system have since got worse.
The law on drugs and psychotropic substances of December 1997 (effective from April 1998) abolished anonymous medical help for drug addicts, prohibited non-governmental, private medical help for such addicts, banned drug use, and discontinued treatment of drug addicts such as methadone replacement therapy. 
Organized crime in Russia
There are many definitions of organized crime and discussion about it (see, among Smith 1975; Arlacchi 1986; Abadinsky 1994; Block 1994; Albanese 1999; Albanese et al. 2003; Fijnaut and Paoli 2004) . In the following discussion, organized crime is defined as the functioning of stable, hierarchical associations, engaged in crime as a form of business, and setting up a system of protection against public control by means of corruption.
Organized crime is a complex social phenomenon, which has a significant influence on the economy and policy of states. The development of organizational structure in criminal activity is a natural process that parallels the structural development of the legitimate social systems and sub-systems, including politics and business corporations. It is a global process rather than one confined to particular countries or regions. Also, the relevant studies have shown that the factors influencing the level of development and the specific form of organized crime are much the same in every country. Criminal business arises, exists and develops under certain conditions, namely: demand for illegal products (e.g. drugs, arms) and services (e.g. sexual); unsatisfied demand for legal wares and services; unemployment and other sources of social exclusion providing a social base for deviance, including criminality; defects of the state's regulatory regime, especially in the fields of taxation and customs.
A criminal organization building up a system of illegal operations is defined by the following characteristics:
• a stable association of people, designed for long-term activity;
• a complex hierarchical structure with functions assigned to specific units of the organization;
• the criminal nature of the activity and associated financial activities;
• the deriving of maximum profits as the key goal of the activity;
• the corruption of powerful organizations and individuals, especially lawenforcement bodies, as the main means of the criminal activity; and
• the aspiration to monopoly in a certain sphere of trade or on a certain territories.
Criminal associations are highly adaptable because they offer very high rewards to staff, enforce strict discipline, and choose staff very carefully -Russian develop because in contemporary Russia legal business activity is impossible due to high taxes and anomie; and by a circular process, the high level of corruption and the associated criminal mentalities make it difficult to conduct legal business, thus creating the opportunity for illegal businesses, which refresh and reinforce the corruption of officials. Russian organized crime makes extensive use of violent methods. Yet the newer tendency is for crime bosses to aspire to make their activities legal, perhaps by a gradual transition through semi-legal activity, by infiltrating the power structure of legal businesses, and with the' aid of money laundering. The final phase is that politics and organized crime merge, as organized crime becomes political, while politics becomes criminal.
Corruption in Russia
There Corruption is an integral part of social institutions (Kuznetchov 2000; Timofeev 2000) . It is an element of the system of management and of government.
To some extent also corrupt practices constitute a social field with its own structure and set of meanings. The main reason for stating that corruption is an integral part of the social fabric is that it performs important social functions. It simplifies administrative relations, accelerates administrative decisions, consolidates and restructures relations between social classes, helps economic development by short-circuiting government regulation, and makes the most economic use of scarce resources (Leff 1964; Scott 1972) .
There are many reasons for stating that corruption forms a social field. The 
How widespread is corruption?
Corruption is a problem all over the world, but the size of the problem varies widely from one country to another. Corruption, always common in Russia, has become pervasive throughout every part of the power structure. In Transparency bribe is inevitable in the sphere of business' (Gilinskiy 2002: 217) . Tax inspection is highly corrupt. One has to bribe when registering a business, when renting premises from state bodies, when acquiring licences to utilize premises, when obtaining low interest bank credit, when submitting reports to tax inspectors, when completing customs formalities and so on. But this does not affect only business people. Everybody must be a suborner in educational institutions, in medical institutions, in various administrative bodies, in dealing with the police and so on. The official data on bribery are collated in Table 7 . But corruption, including the taking of bribes, is of course latent rather than manifest. Hence, the number of recorded incidents tells us more about police actions than about what is happening in wider society. First, these figures are a 'drop in the ocean'. Secondly, the number of recorded crimes involving bribery is twice the number of exposed perpetrators and the number of perpetrators twice the number of convicted persons. Thirdly, the small number who are convicted are 'small fry', including workers, students, and the unemployed. According to the statistics of recorded crime, in 1999 the rate per 100,000 inhabitants of crimes involving corruption (bribes, embezzlement and appropriation) was 11.8 in Moscow; 11.2 in St Petersburg; 78.7 in the Komi
Republic; 75.6 in the Kugansky region; 70.9 in the Kostromskaja region (Luneev 2000) . These figures are obviously absurd, since it is inconceivable that the actual level of corruption should be higher in remote regions than in Moscow and St Petersburg.
A number of factors can help to explain the widespread and pervasive corruption in contemporary Russia. Bribery is one of the old Russian traditions that have been carried forward to the present day and adapted to fit the modern world.
At an earlier stage, corrupt practices common in the Tsarist era were continued under the Soviet regime. When that regime appeared to disintegrate, the former Soviet nomenklatura nevertheless kept its position of power, and imported its corrupt habits into the 'new' power structure. In particular, privatization of state enterprises under the control of members of the nomenklatura created a vast new field for economic activity based on corruption. There was a parallel growth of Russian organized crime syndicates, which use bribery as their principal means of defence. In this new structure, the highest strata of power are corrupted, which leads to corruption at lower levels, too -the Russian proverb is 'The fish rots from the head down'. Because the criminal justice system itself (the police and public prosecutor) is highly corrupt (Corruption and Combating Corruption 2000) , there is little prospect of effective law enforcement to combat corrupt practices. In these circumstances, there seems to be no significant organization or focus of power in
Russia that is in a position to fight corruption.
The state's response to crime in Russia
In Russia, widespread corruption and a high rate of crime are combined with an extremely repressive system of criminal justice. Russia, thus, provides a vivid example of a common pattern whereby punitive policies, instead of reducing crime, are part of a system that maintains it.
The control of deviance, including crime, is a central political issue throughout the developed world. Street crime, organized crime, violent crime and terrorism, impinge on the lives of the general population and give rise to general feelings of insecurity, which from time to time focus on the particular objects of 'moral panics' such as Mods and Rockers in 1960s England (Cohen 1973) or Albanian immigrants in present-day Greece. Politicians exploit these fears for electoral advantage (Garland 2000) . Legislators, politicians, police and criminal justice officials experiment with, or habitually use, repressive methods to gain control over old and new forms of crime. However, control through the criminal justice system has not produced the desired results.
Behaviour is controlled by a vast range of organizations (such as families or employers) and processes (such as informal surveillance and social pressure) that are not directly controlled by the state. One possible response to crime is to mobilize these widespread social resources in order to prevent it. Another possible response -the one that is emphasized in Russia -is punishment: a 'war on crime'
waged by means of the criminal justice system. Mankind has tried every kind of reprisal, including various kinds of capital punishment and refined torture. Despite such repression, criminality has not disappeared.
Some have argued that we are in the midst of a 'crisis of punishment' (Mathiesen 1974) , a crisis of the criminal justice system, a crisis of control over criminality through the criminal law, and a crisis of the control of the police (Christie 1981; Davis and Anderson 1983; Pepinski and Quinney 1991; Hendrics and Byer 1996; Rotwax 1996; Palermo and White 1998; Christie 2000, and others ). An important branch of the penal reform movement is working not only towards abolition of the death penalty, but also towards replacement of imprisonment by alternative measures of punishment, for a transition from retributive justice to restorative justice (Morris 1989; Zehr 1990; Consedine 1995, and others) . That is why the latest recommendations of the National Criminal Justice Commission of the USA offer 'a shift in crime policy from an agenda of "war" to an agenda of "peace"' (Donziger 1996: 218) . S. Barkan (1997: 542) in the 14th of 23 recommendations of his general treatise on crime prevention advises policy makers to 'reduce reliance on imprisonment and to put more emphasis on community correction'.
It is necessary to add that while the 'struggle' is conducted (with doubtful success), mainly against street crimes (or in the expression of Liazos [1972] against 'nuts, sluts and perverts'), a huge layer of 'respectable crime' still remains outside the 'field of battle'. When street crime is dealt with by the police and condemned by the court it functions as a scapegoat, demonstrating the successful struggle against criminality. This is known as the process of selection in criminal justice.
Social and economic inequality is one of the most important criminogenic factors. As argued by Merton (1938 Merton ( , 1957 , the opportunities that people have to satisfy their needs depend on their social and economic status. Inequality of opportunity generates social conflict, dissatisfaction, envy and eventually various forms of deviance. The process of inclusion and exclusion is acquiring more rather than less significance as a cause of crime both now and in the future. Excluded people are becoming a mass reserve, a growing reservoir of social deviation, including criminality.
Repressive social control is the best means of exclusion, especially since the process of selection by the police and criminal justice system ensures that the same particular groups are repeatedly targeted. There appears to be a vicious circle. The repressive mode of social control increases the number of excluded people. The greater the number of people that is excluded, the higher the crime rate rises. The higher the crime rate, the more repressive the social control.
The main tenets of the contemporary Western theory of crime reduction (practised in certain countries) are founded on a recognition of the irrationality and ineffectiveness of retribution -an acceptance that there is a 'crisis of punishment'.
On this theory, there has to be a change of strategy in the response to crime from 'war' to 'peace ' and 'peacemaking' (Pepinski and Quinney 1991) . This means searching for alternative, non-punitive social responses to offending. Also, it means giving priority to forward-looking crime prevention over backward-looking retribution (Gilinskiy 1998a) .
Punishment in contemporary Russia
Unfortunately, crime control is still dominated by repressive approaches in There has been a moratorium on the death penalty since 1998, although this has not been ratified by the Russian parliament. Some data about past use of the death penalty are shown in Table 8 . In line with the moratorium, there have been no death sentences since 1998. In the most recent period before that (1986-98) the number of death sentences per year was 131 on average. Although high, this is considerably lower than at earlier periods during the 20th century. The data on executions (as distinct from death sentences) are not shown here because they are less reliable, but it is believed that about 90 per cent of those sentenced to death were in fact executed. Over the period since 1988, we see a tendency to cut down on punishment without deprivation of freedom in penal and sentencing practice (Table 9) homelessness. The conditions in penitentiary institutions are terrible (Abramkin 1998; Gilinskiy 1998b) . Extremely harsh regimes in institutions for those awaiting trial or under conditional sentence contravene human rights. Overcrowding in pretrial detention centres compels inmates to sleep in shifts. The food is poor. Thousands of prisoners die every year from hunger, tuberculosis, suffocation from lack of oxygen in overcrowded cells in pre-trial detention centres. More than 2300 HIV positive prisoners and more than 92,000 people with tuberculosis were in Russian penitentiary institutions in 1999 (Information Bulletin 2000) .
Conclusion
Russia has a long history of harsh authoritarian regimes and a more recent experience of totalitarian regimes in the 20th century. One consequence of this history is that both society and the state have been criminalized. Criminal practices in institutions of the state and in the wider society support and feed upon one
another. There is a wide social basis for crime and organized crime, because, first, many idle hands are available among young people, and, secondly, legal business activity is largely impossible due to corruption, high taxes, a widespread criminal mentality and social anomie. Organized crime is part of the social fabric in Russia, has infiltrated legal business, government, and every significant part of the power structure, and therefore has a powerful influence on the Russian economy and government policy. It performs some of the functions of law enforcement bodies, such as arbitration, enforcement of rulings, and protection. Corruption is the central problem in Russia, because until it is solved, no other problem can be solved. As long as everything can be bought and sold, those with a stake in Russian society as it is, will be able to buy off attempts to change it. Crime control is still dominated by repressive measures, because these satisfy the demand for action without threatening powerful people who are profiting from criminal activities.
